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Biggest cases ยท June 27, 2017

NotPetya: fake ransomware that wrecked global companies

Destructive software disguised as ransomware spread from a Ukrainian tax program to companies worldwide. Paying did not bring files back.

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Details may change as reporting changes. Information comes from the linked sources, and we do not guarantee it is complete or current.

Why it is on the listOften called the most costly cyberattack in history. The US government says it caused nearly $1 billion in losses to just three victims named in one indictment.

In plain English

NotPetya looked like ransomware, with a ransom note and a payment address. It was not. The way it scrambled computers could not be undone, so there was nothing to buy back.

It began with a tampered update to accounting software widely used in Ukraine. Companies with offices in Ukraine installed it without knowing, and then it moved through their internal networks in minutes, stealing passwords on the way.

Large shipping, drug, food and delivery companies found their computers dead and spent weeks rebuilding them from scratch.

Words used here

Supply-chain attack
Hiding malware in something you trust, like a software update, so people install it themselves.
Wiper
Malware that destroys data. NotPetya pretended to be ransomware but behaved like one.
Lateral movement
An attacker hopping from one computer in your network to the next.

What happened

Cisco's Talos research concluded that the infections began through the update system of M.E.Doc, a Ukrainian tax-preparation program. The attackers had reportedly got into the update server with stolen administrator credentials.

In October 2020 the US Justice Department charged six officers of Russia's military intelligence (the GRU) over a series of attacks that included NotPetya. It says NotPetya caused nearly $1 billion in losses to just three victims named in the charges: a hospital system in Pennsylvania, a delivery company's subsidiary and a drug maker. Charges are accusations, not verdicts.

How it unfolded

  1. April to June 2017

    Backdoor added to the update system, according to Talos.

  2. June 27, 2017

    Malicious update runs. Infections spread globally within hours.

  3. Following weeks

    Affected companies rebuild thousands of computers.

  4. October 2020

    US charges against six GRU officers.

Who was affected

Ukraine first and worst, then multinational companies, hospitals and ports in many countries.

What the response was

  • Companies shut down networks, restored from backups where they existed, and rebuilt the rest.
  • Governments assessed it as a state-backed destructive attack, not a criminal one.

What went wrong

  • Internal networks were flat: once in, malware reached everything.
  • Software updates were trusted blindly.
  • Some firms had no usable backups of key servers.

What worked

  • Companies with offline copies of key systems recovered much faster.

What organisations should do differently

  • Split your network so one infected computer cannot reach all the rest.
  • Keep offline backups of the systems the business cannot run without.
  • Treat updates from small vendors as a risk; know which software is critical.

What you can do today

  • Identify the few systems you could not live without for a week, and confirm each has a backup you have tested.
  • Turn on automatic updates for operating systems, and take extra care with software from small vendors.

The lesson that still holds

Your biggest risk can come through something you trust. Limit how far one bad update can travel, and keep a way back.

Sources

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