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Post Mortem

How the systems we depend on can fail

Real attacks on water, power, fuel, banks, phones and hospitals, how they worked, what people noticed, and what to do about it. Calm, sourced, and honest about how likely each is.

The honest picture

Total collapse is not what the record shows. The incidents in this section lasted hours to weeks, hit a region or a sector, and ended with the lights, taps and cash machines coming back. Ordinary causes (storms, equipment faults, plain ransomware) are far more common than state attacks.

Still, it has been shown that grids can be switched off, pipelines halted and satellite networks wiped, mostly in Ukraine and in criminal ransomware cases elsewhere. Preparing for a few days without something is cheap, useful in a storm too, and covers nearly all of it. That is why the advice here is the same as that of emergency agencies: three days, calm, practical.

Open the printable survival kit

Who does this, and why

Governments

Espionage, preparing options for a future conflict, and in wartime, direct disruption. They are the most capable and the least likely to target you personally.

Criminal gangs

Ransomware for money. They do not aim at infrastructure, but hospitals, pipelines and utilities pay, so they get hit.

Activists and cut-outs

Loud, often shallow, sometimes fronts for states. A claim of responsibility is not proof of who did it.

How governments get malware into infrastructure

This is a plain-language map, not a how-to. Each approach has a real, publicly documented example. Attribution is given the way the source gives it: charged, assessed by a government, or widely reported.

  1. Method 1

    Get in quietly, then wait

    Some state-backed groups break into networks long before they use the access. Agencies call this pre-positioning. They avoid custom malware that could be spotted and instead use the target's own tools and valid logins, so the activity looks like normal administration. The aim is to hold the option of causing disruption during a future crisis.

    Volt Typhoon (China-linked) in US critical infrastructure

    In a joint warning, US and allied agencies said they were highly confident the group was hiding in the office networks of vital services. The aim, they said, was to be able to reach the systems that run equipment and disrupt them in a crisis.

    Source: CISA, NSA, FBI and partners, Feb 2024

  2. Method 2

    Hide inside a trusted update

    Instead of attacking thousands of targets one by one, an attacker compromises one supplier and lets the supplier's normal software update deliver the payload. The customers install it themselves.

    SolarWinds (attributed by the US to Russia's SVR)

    A tampered update to network-management software reached thousands of organisations; a smaller number, including US agencies, were then spied on.

    Source: CISA, 2020 to 2021Full case study

  3. Method 3

    Destroy, and disguise it as crime

    Wiper malware erases data. Some wipers have been dressed up as ransomware so the damage looks like ordinary crime. There is no decryption key to buy, because nothing was meant to be recovered.

    NotPetya (US Justice Department charges against Russian military officers)

    Spread through a tampered update in Ukraine and then around the world, causing nearly $1 billion in losses to just three victims named in the indictment.

    Source: US Department of Justice, Oct 2020Full case study

  4. Method 4

    Cross the gap to physical equipment

    Some operations aim at machines, not data: pumps, breakers, centrifuges. They work by learning how a specific plant is controlled and then issuing commands that look legitimate to the equipment.

    Stuxnet and the 2015 Ukraine blackout

    Stuxnet is widely reported, but never officially confirmed, to be a state operation against Iran's enrichment plant. The Ukrainian blackout was investigated by US agencies and later linked by the US Justice Department to Russian military officers.

    Source: CISA ICS-CERT, 2016Full case study

  5. Method 5

    Use criminals and cut-outs

    States sometimes work through groups that present themselves as activists or criminals. It gives them deniability and makes the response harder to decide. When a group claims an attack, that claim is not evidence of who is really behind it.

    Kyivstar, Ukraine's largest mobile operator

    A group calling itself a hacktivist collective claimed the December 2023 attack. Ukraine's security service said it suspected Russian military hackers who had been inside since at least May 2023. That is the Ukrainian government's assessment, not independently confirmed fact.

    Source: GovInfoSecurity

System by system

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