Details may change as reporting changes. Information comes from the linked sources, and we do not guarantee it is complete or current.
Why it is on the listThe defining software supply-chain attack: it targeted government departments and security companies through software they trusted.
In plain English
SolarWinds makes software that IT teams use to watch over their networks. Attackers broke into SolarWinds' own build process and added hidden code to a genuine update. Customers who installed it were, in effect, inviting the attackers in.
The attackers did not use the access on everyone. They picked a smaller group of high-value targets and moved carefully, mostly reading email and files for months.
It was found when a security company, FireEye, noticed its own tools had been stolen and traced the intrusion back to the update.
Words used here
- Backdoor
- Hidden code that lets an attacker back in whenever they like.
- Build process
- The automated steps that turn a company's source code into the software it ships.
What happened
In December 2020 the security firm FireEye (now part of Google's Mandiant) said it had been broken into. It traced the break-in to tampered SolarWinds Orion updates carrying a hidden way in, which it named SUNBURST.
CISA issued an emergency directive and an alert describing a widespread compromise of government agencies, critical infrastructure and private firms. In April 2021 the US government attributed the activity to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
How it unfolded
- Early 2020
Attackers get into SolarWinds' build system. Tainted updates ship from spring.
- December 8 to 13, 2020
FireEye announces its own breach and identifies the backdoored update.
- December 2020
CISA orders US agencies to disconnect affected servers.
- April 15, 2021
US government attributes the campaign to the SVR.
Who was affected
Thousands of organisations installed the update. The attackers then went on to a much smaller set, including several US government departments and technology companies.
What the response was
- Customers disconnected or rebuilt affected servers and rotated credentials.
- SolarWinds published a security advisory and fixed releases.
- The US government issued new requirements for software supplied to federal agencies.
What went wrong
- The software company's own build system was compromised.
- Customers gave a monitoring tool wide access to their networks.
- Months passed before anyone noticed.
What worked
- A security company noticed anomalies in its own systems and shared what it found publicly.
What organisations should do differently
- Give monitoring and management tools only the access they need.
- Know which vendors have a path into your systems.
- Log and review unusual activity from trusted tools too.
What you can do today
- List the tools and vendors that can log in to your systems or run code there.
- Remove access that is no longer needed, and turn on logs for what remains.
The lesson that still holds
You inherit the security of everything you install. Know what has a path into your systems, and give each piece the least it needs.
Sources
- Advanced Persistent Threat compromise of government agencies, critical infrastructure and private sector organizations (AA20-352A)CISA, updated Apr 15, 2021
- Highly evasive attacker leverages SolarWinds supply chain to compromise multiple global victimsFireEye / Google Cloud Mandiant, Dec 2020
- SolarWinds security advisorySolarWinds
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